15.(MEDIEVAL INDIA)THE STATE IN INDIA UNDER THE SULTANAT

References: Satish Chandra(Medieval India) and JL Mehta(Advanced Study In History Of Medieval India).Also minor facts from other books and figure and facts from verified Internet sources.

15.THE STATE IN INDIA UNDER THE SULTANAT

Any state has to be seen in the context of the traditions, ideas and beliefs of the people concerned;

social structure, including the character of the ruling class and its relations with other power elites as

well as the masses; system of production and relations of production, to mention the main. Such a

comprehensive study can hardly be carried out in a brief compass. However, some main points may be

delineated.

Debate regarding the nature of the state, its origin, the nature of monarchy, outlook towards the

people, relationship with religion and religious orders, the right of rebellion etc. were very old in India,

as is clear from the Arthashastra of Kautilya which mentions many older schools of political thought

which are lost to us. Debate about the nature of the state continued, and figures in the Mahabharata

and in the writings of Jain thinkers, as well in the Dharmashastras. In general, raj niti or political conduct,

and dharma-niti or moral conduct were considered separate, but interdependent entities.

Muslim thinking on the state had a complex evolution. Abu Yusuf Yaqubi (d. 798), al-Farabi (d. 950), alMawardi (d. 1031), al-Ghazali (d.llll) etc. gave a definite shape to the Muslim thinking on the subject,

specially in the context of the decline of the Abbasid Caliphate and the rise of de facto independent

states. While the earlier theory of the unity of spiritual authority and secular power in the person of the

Imam or Khalifa was retained, the sultans were accorded an independent position, as long as they

accepted the theoretical superiority of the Caliph or Khalifa. Thus, the fiction of Islamic unity was

retained but, in practice, the sultans were left

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free in their political conduct, as long as they did not openly violate the shara.

The Turks who came to India were deeply influenced by the Islamic thinking or practices regarding the

state, though they could not completely shake off their tribal/clan traditions. They also showed

themselves to be intensely practical in their political dealings, si multaneously trying to remain within the

framework of Islamic law (shara).

i. Legal, Political and Social Character of the State 

From a legal point of view, the Delhi sultanat can be considered an independent entity with the rise to

power in 1206 of Qutbuddin Aibak, a slave of Muizzuddin Muhammad bin Sam, and the end of its

subordination to Ghazni. However, it was not till the consolidation of Iltutmish's power that the rulers of

Ghazni ceased to claim suzreignty over the territories comprising the sultanat of Delhi. In fact, this was a

consequence of the conquest of Ghazni by the Mongol leader, Chingez Khan. It led to the flight of

Yalduz, the successor of Muizuddin Muhammed bin Sam, to Delhi, and his defeat and imprisonment by

Iltutmish.

Although asserting their independence, the rulers at Delhi were keen to maintain their links with the

rest of the Islamic world. One method of doing this was to get a formal letter of investment (manshur)

from the Abbasid Caliph at Baghdad. In 1229, Iltutmish received such a letter of investiture, along with

splendid robes, from the Caliph of Baghdad. Henceforth, the sultans of Delhi inscribed the name of the

Caliph in their coinage, and his name was included in the khutba at the time of the Friday prayers. The

sultans also styled themselves Nasir-amirul-mominin, i.e. the lieutent of the leader of the faithful, the

Khalifa or Caliph. It has been argued that legally the sultans of Delhi became subordinate to the Caliphs.

However, the legal aspect was the least important in the eyes of contemporaries. The legal

independence of the sultans of Delhi had not been questioned by any one before the receipt of the

letter of investment. Nor was the legal status of the sultan questioned by anyone even when Mubarak

Shah, the successor of Alauddin Khalji, repudiated allegiance to the Caliph, and declared himself Imam

or Khalifa. The question of getting the Caliph's letter of investment was really a moral question. It also

catered to, and helped to maintain the fiction of the unity of the Islamic world under the leadership of

the Caliph. But this unity had broken down much earlier, partly on account of

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the rise of various religious sects, and partly on account of the rise of independent kingdoms under

Turkish and other adventurers. The rise of the Mongols fractured this unity still further.

When Muhammad bin Tughlaq was facing a series of internal revolts, he sought and obtained an

investiture from a descendent of the Abbasid Caliph who was living at Cairo after the murder in 1259 of

the Abbasid Caliph at Baghdad by the Mongol leader, Halaku. This was in 1343. Earlier, he had removed

his own name from the coins, and put in its place that of the Caliph. But these steps had little impact on

the leaders of the rebellions. Firuz Tughlaq twice obtained investiture and robes of honour from the

Caliph, even before he stood forth as a champion of orthodoxy. But the prestige of the Abbasid Caliph

had gradually declined. Following the example of Timur, later the Mughal rulers themselves assumed

the title of Imam or Khalifa.

Thus, the institution of Khalifat had little relevance in the context of India during the sultanat and the

Mughal periods.

With the advent of the Turks, a new type of a state was introduced in north India. During the early

phase, maximum freedom was given to the military leaders to carry out conquests in different parts of

the country while a strong corp of troops was stationed with, and operated under the direct control of

the Sultan. This type of loose or decentralized despotism was replaced by a highly centralised state by

Balban. With some interruptions, as for example, under Jalaluddin Khalji, the Delhi sultanat maintained

its highly centralized character till the end of the 14th century when, following the downfall of the

Tughlaqs and the rise of the Lodis to power, a brief experiment was made at reasserting the principle of

decentralised despotism, with Afghan tribal leaders claiming a larger share in power. This led to

renewed clashes between the sultan and the nobles leading to the defeat of Ibrahim Lodi at the field of

Panipat in 1526.

While a tussle for power between the sultan and the nobles was a constant feature of the sultanat, the

precise extent and degree of centralisation varying from ruler to ruler, the basic struggle for power

between the nobles and the sultan was settled in favour of the sultan with the accession of Balban to

the throne. The Turkish nobles had failed to act as a corp, or to rally around a wazir of their choice, or to

set up any institutions to control the power of the sultan.

Despite its outer appearance, the character of the state varied considerably during the 13th and 14th

centuries. During the 13th century, the state was very much the institutionalized form of a

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foreign conquest. The nobles, mostly of Turkish extraction, had little knowledge or links with the

country, and exercised control over the countryside from their military cantonments in the towns and

the forts sprinkled over the country. It was during this period that the Sufi saints, particularly the

Chishtis, played an important role in establishing links between the new ruling class and the populace, as

we have already seen.

The 13th century was practically a period of Turkish domination over the state. Most of the nobles, both

free and slave, who had accompanied Muizzuddin Muhammad bin Sam to India were Islamized Turks.

The Khaljis who were not considered Turks were another important group. But they did not find favour

with the successors of Qutbuddin Aibak at Delhi, and preferred to carve out a semi-independent domain

of their own in North Bengal.

A second group which held important positions under Iltutmish were the Tajiks. There was a sprinkling

of Arabs, Yamanis etc. who were generally appointed in the department of the sadr. Unlike the Turks

who were rude warriors, the Tajiks whose mother-tongue was Persian, were cultured and refined.

Hence, they were generally preferred for administrative posts in the central government. Iltutmish's

wazir, Nizamul Mulk Junaidi, was a Tajik. The Turks, both free and slave, resented the Tajiks and their

attempt to grab the higher administrative posts. This came to the surface after the death of Iltutmish

when most of the Tajiks were massacred by the Turks. The wazir, Nizamul Mulk, escaped, but was not

heard of again. This ended the Tajik challenge to the Turks.

The Turkish zealousness of not allowing non-Turks to acquire high office was displayed in their hostility

towards the Abyssinian, Malik Yakut, who had been appointed amir akhur (superintendent of the Royal

stables) by Razia. However, the Turkish nobles did not hesitate to use an Indian Muslim, Imaduddin

Raihan, to displace the chihalgani slave officers, and to try and establish their own domination over the

sultan.

Balban's reign has many contradictions. Balban destroyed the power of the chihalgani Turks.

Simultaneously, he set his face against the "low born", i.e. the Indian Muslims, even for appointment in

the lower rungs of the administration. Thus, he stood forth as the champion of the Turkish domination

of the state. Simultaneously, he declared himself to be a decendent of the Iranian hero. Afrasiyab. and

adhered to pre-Islamic Iranian forms and symbols of suzreignty. Thus, he tried to fuse together Iranian

forms and Turkish domination.

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Although the institution of slavery played an important role in fusing together different ethnic groups

among the Muslims, particularly the Turks who were divided into tribes and regional groupings, the

state in India can hardly be called a 'slave state', a term used by early British historians, but now

discarded. Many of the nobles started their careers as slaves in the service of a sultan or a leading noble.

But they were freed (manumitted) at a stage during their rise to high positions. Thus, Iltutmish

presented his letter of manumission to the ulema when they called on him after his accession to the

throne. According to Islamic theory, only a free person could accend the throne. Thus, it is also wrong to

talk of a 'slave dynasty'.

Despite Balban's efforts, the Turkish domination of the State had begun to erode during his life time.

Thus, he was compelled to admit a section of the Mongols to the nobility during the last years of his

reign. Earlier, following the death of his son, Prince Muhammad, he had to recruit Khaljis under

Jalaluddin Khalji to fight the Mongols. Also, during the Bengal campaign, towards the end of his life, he

found a section of the Turkish nobles and the army to be inefficient and undependable. He punished the

Turkish nobles and soldiers, but he had to fall back upon the support of some of the rais of East U.P., and

to resort to a leve'e en masse to raise local soldiers to suppress the Bengal rebellion.

The Khaljis ended the Turkish domination or policy of Turkish exclusivism. They did not discriminate

against the Turks, but threw the doors open to the talents among various sections of the Muslims. Thus,

Alauddin's wazir was Nusrat Khan Jalesar, and Zafar Khan his Mir Arz. Both were famous warriors but

were non-Turks, possibly Indian Muslims. Another non-Turk who rose to power was Malik Kafur. It

seems that there was an influx of a large number of non-Turks including Indian Muslims into the nobility

during the latter years of Alauddin Khalji. This alone can explain the rise to power, even though very

brief, of the Baradus, an uneducated but fighting group of Rajputs under Khusrau Khan, following the

murder of Mubarak Khalji (1320).

It has been suggested that with the rise of the Khaljis, and the end of Turkish monopoly of high offices,

an "integrated Indo-Muslim state" emerged in India, i.e., one in which different sections of the Muslims,

including Indian Muslims, were admitted to the nobility, and high offices filled on the basis of efficiency

and the pre-dilections of individual rulers, rather than on the basis of their ethnic origins. Sufficient

research work has not been done to prove or effectively

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disprove the point. We do, however, know that the ruling classes and the rulers in India strongly

believed in the principle of superiority of blood so that only those who could establish their links with

'respected' families, whether in the secular or the religious fields, were entitled to high offices in

government. The earliest Muslim political thinker in India, Fakr-i-Mudabbir, who wrote during the reign

of Iltutmish, says:

"Posts of diwan, shagird and muharrir (revenue posts) should be given only to ahl-i-qalam (the educated

sections) and whose ancestors had served rulers and amirs."

Ziauddin Barani who wrote his political tract, Fatawa-i-Jahandari, while in prison during the early years

of Firuz Tughlaq, echoes the same views. He says that at the time of creation, some minds were inspired

with the art of letters and of writing, others with horsemanship, and yet others in the weaving, stichcraft, carpentry, hair-cutting and tanning. Thus, men should practice only those crafts and professions

"for which men have been inspired (and) are practised by them". He goes on to say, "Even if a man of

base or low birth is adorned with a hundred merits, he will not be able to organise and administer the

country according to expectations, or be worthy of leadership or political trust."

Barani was, apparently, voicing the prejudices of the ruling sections. But these views had a definite

bearing on the character of the state. The state remained the exclusive preserve of the so-called

"respectable" classes. The only ruler who tried to breach this policy was Muhammad bin Tughlaq who

appointed a number of persons, both Hindus and Muslims, from the so-called low classes on the basis of

their efficiency. But there was a strong reaction against this from the established ruling classes. Under

Firuz Tughlaq, we find no reference to the appointment of such people, either Hindus or Muslims.

Thus, in a highly fragmented society it is hardly possible to speak of an "integrated" Indo-Muslim state.

The position of converted India Muslims from the lower classes hardly changed. The rise of a converted

Tailang Brahman, Khan-i-Jahan Maqbul, to the position of wazir under Firuz Tughlaq, or of an Ain-ulMulk, a Hindustani, who was governor of Awadh under Muhammad Tughlaq and later was Firuz's

mushrif-i-mamlik (auditor-general), should not be interpreted to mean that Indian converts from the

upper castes had now become a dominant element in the nobility. Muhammad Tughlaq's induction of a

large number of foreigners in the nobility, calling them 'aizza' is an index to the continued preference of

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foreigners over Indians. It was one of these nobles who later set up the Bahmani kingdom in the Deccan,

and another in Gujarat.

The highly mobile central elite, paid by non-hereditory iqtas, backed by armed cavalry, un-encumbered

by any local vested interests, was the main instrument of Turkish centralization. The state was

hierarchical in the sense that there was a definite graded order in society and the state. The nobles,

graded into three classes, Khans, Maliks and Amirs, formed the top rung, although great deference was

paid to the ulema and the mashaikh (saints).

ii. Relations with the ulema

The powers and position of the ulema in the state, and its relationship with the secular rulers has been a

matter of continuous debate in the Islamic world. After the end of the rule of the first four Caliphs at

Mecca, there was a division between the spiritual and secular authority, most of the leading clergymen

remaining at Mecca, and the centre of political authority being shifted by the Umaiyyad Khalifas to

Damascus. With the shifting of the political control to Baghdad by the Abbasids, who claimed descent

from the Prophet, an attempt was made to reintegrate spiritual and political authority under their aegis.

However, in effect, the political elements often dominated the spiritual. Even this unity, however

limited, ended with the break up of the Abbasid Caliphate towards the end of the 9th century, and the

rise of independent kingdoms, mostly under Turkish sultans. The Turks who were newly converted to

Islam, paid great deference to the clergy, the ulema, who were supposed to interpret Islam to the

community. But they kept effective political control in their hands. The attitude of contempt towards

the clergymen and lower officials (nawisandan, or writers) for advising about higher political affairs is

explained by the remarks of Alauddin Khalji to Alaul Mulk, the kotwal of Delhi, when he advised

Alauddin to persuade the Mongols to depart by using diplomatic and other, i.e. financial, means.

Alauddin rejected the advise as "unbecoming", and clinched the argument by saying "you speak thus

because you are a nawisanda (clerk or scribe) and the son of a nawisanda." Elsewhere, Barani says that

these sections would not distinguish the head of a horse from its tail!

It has been argued that the state set up by the Turks was a theocracy because it was based on the

Muslim holy law, the shara, which could be interpreted only by the ulema. In this connection, it may be

pointed out that the word "theocracy" was originally

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applied to the Jewish commonwealth from the time of Moses to the rise of monarchy, and is

understood as "government or State governed by God directly or through a sacerdotal class." It was also

implied that for such a sacerdotal class to govern, it should be organised formally, as in the case of

Jewish or Christian Churches. It has been said that in the absence of an organised Church, the Muslim

ulema could not govern, and hence there could be no theocratic state.

The entire discussion is somewhat artificial because a purely theocratic state never existed anywhere for

any length of time, as also because the term or concept of a theocratic state as set out above was never

discussed in India during medieval times. What was discussed and is relevant is whether a truly Islamic

state could be set up in India. And at the back of it was the controversy regarding the extent to which

shara as interpreted by the orthodox ulema, could be implemented in India.

This matter was anxiously debated during the sultanat period, was revived under the Mughals, and

continued under British rule. It still arises under various forms.

In general, the sultans in India, while paying deference to the ulema, did not feel bound to consult them

or accede to their views where matters of state were concerned. Thus, Iltutmish did not consult the

theologians before he declared Razia as his successor. Balban introduced pre-Islamic ceremonials in his

court, including sijda and pabos which were considered un-Islamic by the ulema. In Alauddin Khalji's

time, Qazi Mughis declared that the treasures looted by him from Deogir were bait-ul-mal, or part of the

public treasury, and that as sultan, he was entitled to take from the treasury only as much as was

allowed to a common trooper. Alauddin rejected the advice of the Qazi, and declared:

"Although I have not studied the Book (the Quran), nor am I learned (in religious sciences), I am a

Muslim of a Muslim stock. To prevent rebellions in which thousands perish, I issue such orders as I

conceive to be for the good of the state, and the benefit of the people. Men are heedless, disresectful,

and disobey my commands. I am then compelled to be severe and bring them to obedience. I do not

know whether this is according to the shara, or against the shara; whatever I think for the good of the

state or suitable for the emergency, that I decree."

Since Barani wrote more than fifty years after Alauddin Khalji, these may not have been the words of

Alauddin, but views attributed to him by Barani. Also, they refer to a particular situation, a

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situation in which Alauddin had to give harsh punishments to prevent rebellions, and to ensure

compliance of his orders. They do not imply that Alauddin Khalji regularly or wilfully disregarded the

shara. Barani makes the position clear by saying that "when he (Alauddin) attained to kingship, he was

quite convinced that government and administration were quite independent of the rules and orders of

the shariat; and that while the former appertained to kings, the latter had been assigned to qazis and

muftis."

This divergence in the perceived values of the ruler and the ulema was not peculiar to Alauddin.

Muhammad bin Tughlaq issued many secular decrees (zawabits) to supplement the shariat. Even an

orthodox ruler, Firuz, forbade cutting the hands, feet, noses etc. of criminals even though it had been

sanctioned by the sharia.

Taking all these factors into account, Barani came to the conclusion that a truely Islamic state based on

faith (din-dari) was not feasible in India. All that was feasible was an Islamic State based on worldly

considerations (dunya-dari). In such a state, the head of the state, the sultan, had to be a God fearing

Muslim; Saiyyids, religious scholars, shaikhs etc. were to be honoured and given employment; holy wars

(jihad) and holy campaigns were to be waged against the neighbouring rajas and chiefs; and Muslims

not allowed to flout the holy law in their public behaviour so that sins and impurity, wickedness and

wrong doing sink low. Barani makes it clear, however, that 'what the sultan did in private, or a citizen in

his house was not the concern of the state'.

Thus, the state was not a theocracy. Nor can it be called "ethnocentric" because shara as defined by the

clergy was hardly the core concern of the sultans. It was formally Islamic in character, but was based not

on social equality, but on hierarchy. In practice, there was little distinction between the lives of the

ordinary people, Hindu or Muslim. The clergy were to be honoured but the state was run not on their

advise, but on political considerations and the interests of the ruling elite. As we shall see, this was not

always an easy enterprise, and sometimes, there was a sharp difference of opinion between the

orthodox clergy and the sultans, especially regarding the extent of religious freedom to be accorded to

the Hindus, and their role in the working of the state.

iii. Position of the Hindus

The state as we have described above, postulated considerable but defined religious freedom to those

Hindus who had accepted

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the overlordship of the Muslim ruler, and agreed to abide by the rules and regulations enforced by him.

Such people were called zimmis or protected persons. The zimmis had the right to worship according to

their rites, and to maintain and repair temples "since buildings cannot stand for ever". They were,

however, not allowed to build new temples "in opposition to Islam". This clause was vague; it implied

that Hindus could build new temples in their houses, or in villages where there were no Muslims. It

could also mean that in case of opposition by the Hindus, even old temples could be destroyed. As we

have seen, in times of war even temples of long standing were sacked and destroyed. In the early phase,

some of them were converted into mosques, or the plundered material from their ruins used for

building mosques. But this stopped once the Turks were in a position to erect their own buildings.

However, in case of wars with local chiefs or neighbouring rulers, the destruction of their temples

became acts of religious merit. Even this came to a stop when Turkish rule had been spread all over the

country.

In addition to loyalty and service to the ruler, the Hindus are also required to pay jizyah. The origins of

jizyah are not clear; some trace it to poll -tax on individuals levied in Greece, and pre-Islamic Iran from

which it was taken over, others consider it to be a tax in lieu of military service, and still others equate it

to land-tax or kharaj. This confusion was sought to be resolved by the various schools of shariat, which

arose towards the end of the 9th century and at the beginning of the 10th century. While some of them,

tracing the example of the Prophet towards idol-worshippers in Arabia, argued that idol-worshippers

had only the option of Islam or death, a few others gave jizyah as the third option. The Hanafi school of

sharia which was generally followed in India used the formula "Islam or death, or payment of jizyah'. We

do not know how precisely jizyah was assessed or collected during the Sultanat period. In some

passages of Barani, the peasants are to pay kharaj or jizyah, that is, they were considered one and the

same and assessed as a lump sum in the villages. Thus, among the cesses collected by Alauddin Khalji, or

even Firuz, there is no reference to jizyah. How it was collected in the towns we do not know. According

to the shara, women, children, people who were lunatics, and the indigent were exempt from jizyah.

This left the artisans and the merchants. Till the time of Firuz Tughlaq, Brahmans too, were exempt.

Thus, during the sultanat period, jizyah as a separate tax effected only a small section in the towns. As

such, it could hardly be considered a devise for forcing conversion to Islam. For a section

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of the orthodox ulema, however, jizyah was a means of harassing and humiliating and insulting the

Hindus. Thus, Qazi Mughis went so far as to say that if the collector of the jizyah should want to spit on

the face of the Hindu, he should open his mouth. This was on lines of Manu's injunction that if a shudra

heard the Vedas, molten lead should be poured in his ears. Both were impractical, but showed a state of

the mind.

Some theologians argued that as idolaters, and not having a revealed book like the Quran, the Hindus

were ineligible for jizyah, and should be given the option of only Islam or death. If Barani is to be

believed, such an argument was put forward before Iltutmish by a group of theologians. On behalf of

the Sultan, his wazir, Nizamul Mulk Junaidi, replied that such a policy was contrary to tradition, not

having been enforced by Mahmud, the hero of Islam, and impractical because the Muslims were too few

in numbers, "like salt in a dish (of food)."

Barani perhaps did not know that the Turkish sultans were only following the example of the Arab rulers

of Sindh who had granted the Hindus there the option of paying jizyah, and employed many of them in

civil administration.

It is also necessary to remember that in the Delhi Sultanat, the Hindus formed a predominant section of

the population, even in the heart of the empire, Delhi. They continued to dominate the country -side as

khuts, muqaddams, chaudhuri, rana, thakur, etc., as also trade and finance in the towns, as well as the

transport trade (as banjaras). As Alauddin told Qazi Mughis, even within 100 kos of the capital, "the

khuts and muqaddams ride upon fine horses, wear fine clothes, shoot with Persian bows, make war

upon each other, and go out hunting...give parties and drink wine." In his Fatawa-i-Jahandari, Barani

referring to them sadly notes:

"....out of consideration for the fact that the infidels and polytheists are payers of tributes and protected

persons (zimmis), these infidels are honoured, distinguished, favoured and made eminent; the kings

bestow drums, banners, ornaments, cloaks of brocade and caprisoned horses upon them, and appoint

them to governorships, high posts and offices."

There is, no doubt, an element of exaggeration in this statement because hardly any Hindus were

appointed to high offices, except during the reign of Muhammad bin Tughlaq. But there is little doubt

about the financial affluence of a section of the Hindus because we are told by Barani that the sahs

(bankers), mehtas (administrators) and pandits "build houses like palaces...live in delights and

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comfort. They take Musalmans in their service and make them run before their horses, even in the

capital of Islam."

Of course, the affluence affected only a small section of the Hindus. The mass of the people, both

Hindus and Muslim, continued to be poor, and exploited by the ruling classes.

To what extent the Sultanat affected the daily life of an average Hindu is a matter of debate. According

to one view, he was hardly affected because the state did not interfere with his life as long as he paid his

taxes which, in the villages, continued to be collected by the khuts and muqaddams, or mis and thakurs.

He got into trouble only when there was a local war, or famine, or when the village officials or the local

chief delayed or withheld land revenue. In matters of personal and civil laws, the Hindus continued to be

governed by caste panchayats, and by the village zamindar or chief. The qazis dealt with Muslim law, or

only when a Hindu and a Muslim were involved.

However, in a centralized state, the influence of the state tended to grow, as was shown by the agrarian

policies of Alauddin Khalji and Muhammad bin Tughlaq. In matters of religion, considerable freedom

was accorded. Jalaluddin Khalji's observation that the Hindu passed in procession, beating gongs and

symbols, outside his palace, to immerse the images in the Jamuna exemplifies it. Muhammad bin

Tughlaq even participated in Hindu festivals, such as, Holi, and held discussions with Jogis, and Jain

saints. However, in a despotic state such freedom was often regarded as a matter of grace rather than a

matter of right. Thus, local despots could always act in an arbitrary manner, particularly when a section

of the ulema constantly advocated and justified a policy of sternly repressing the Hindus. Thus, they

justified Firuz Tughlaq's publicly burni ng a brahman on charge of converting a Muslim, or his destroying

a number of temples around Delhi on the charge that they were new, and that in the festivals held

around them, Muslims also used to participate. Perhaps, the only occasion when the ulema intervened

to prevent a ruler from acting in an arbitrary manner against the Hindus was when they dissuaded

Sikandar Lodi from attacking the pilgrims and destroying and desecrating the old temple and tank at

Kurukshetra on the ground that the temple was an ancient one, and previous Muslim sultans had

allowed the Hindu to bathe there. It would seem that the traditions of broad religious toleration had

become well established by then.

Despite some limitations, it must be conceded that during the sultanat period, the state allowed more

religious freedom than was

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allowed to non-Christians, or even to rival sects of Christians in Europe till the 16th century. The state

was, of course, formally an Islamic one in the sense explained by Barani. This implied that the Muslims

were a privileged group, and that it was a special obligation on the state to look after their moral and

material welfare. This was by no means new in India because earlier it were the Rajputs who had formed

a privileged group, and their privileges, and the privileges of the brahman were accepted as a matter of

course.

iv. Despotism, Benevolence and Development

In their thinking about the state, Muslim political thinkers raised questions about the nature and

legitimate objectives of state power, and the basis of the moral authority of the state and the sultan.

Political thinkers considered monarchy to be the only safeguard against social anarchy in which property

and the honour of women could not be protected. In general, the political thinkers preferred the rule of

one individual, the sultan, who had the necessary social and moral qualities, and who, in a sense,

enjoyed the mandate of heaven over a oligarchy, or 'noblocracy'. The question of despotism or

autocracy bothered many medieval Muslim thinkers. Ziauddin Barani considered despotism to be

basically un-Islamic, and considered that religion was the only check against despotism or abuse of

personal power by a monarch. However, they did not give the right of rebellion against an unjust ruler,

except in some special circumstances, such as open and blatant violation of the shara. Barani

compromised with despotism because giving of harsh punishments was inescapable in a situation such

as India. Specifically, Barani believed that the mean and ignoble, whom he compares to "animals and

beasts of prey" were "plentiful and abundant." Their punishment and stern repression by a despotic

ruler was not only inescapable but desirable. Thus, Barani finds a social justification for despotism.

The question was: how to maintain the moral authority of the state in this situation? It was in this

context that medieval political thinkers emphasized the concept of adl or justice. Justice implied making

no distinction between rich and poor, relation and stranger, noble and ignoble. Nizamuddin, the author

of Siyasat Nama, lays great emphasis on the concept of justice. Many thinkers, including Barani, give

dispensing of justice even a higher position than discharging religious obligations. For a ruler, an act of

justice was greater than seventy years of namaz, according to Barani. However, justice

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also implies the preservation of the existing social order which was organized on a rigid hierarchical

order in which the mean and the ignoble which included the artisans and peasants were to be kept out

of power, and in a position of dependence.

Despite these, justice did provide a certain restraint on the exercise of arbitrary power, especially by the

nobles and the lower officials. It should also be seen within the framework of the concept of

benevolence, or serving the people. The saints, both Muslim and Hindu, constantly emphasised this

point, both for themselves as for the rulers. Within limitations, they also criticized the hierarchical

system of society, and upheld the concept of human equality. To that extent, they became a vehicle for

postulating popular aspirations, and by their open-ended approach provide them a relief and a means of

escape from a rigidly unequal order. However, as we have seen, at the political level, the concept of

benevolence was, at best, given only lip service by the rulers. After Jalaluddin Khalji, Firuz Tughlaq was

the first Turkish monarch who tried to espouse it, particularly in the context of the Muslims, though

non-Muslims could not be completely excluded.

Could such a state, highly centralized and militaristic, with a ruling class which had a narrow social base,

promote the economic and cultural development of the country? In the preceding pages we have seen

how, despite all these limitations, there was growth of architecture, literature and music in the country

in which both Muslims and Hindus contributed. The growth of sufism and the bhakti movements also

tended to mitigate mutual hostility, and provide a platform for common interacti on. In the economic

fields, while only a few monarchs, such as Muhammad and Firuz Tughlaq were actively concerned with

the expansion and improvement of cultivation, the centralized system of revenue administration made

it possible for the state to intervene more effectively in village life. The centralization of a high

proportion of the revenue surplus in the hands of the ruling class gave a fillip to artisanal production of a

superior type, and promoted urbanization. The opening up of the frontiers of the country to trade, and

wider cultural links with the Islamic world, the improvement of road communications, the provision of a

stable currency, the silver tanka, and the active promotion of overseas trade with countries of southeast Asia and China led to the situation that, as modern research reveals, when the Portuguese entered

the Indian Ocean towards the end of the 15th century, it was found that trade and prosperity in the

region in which India played a key role was at an unprecedentedly high level. But

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which were the groups and elements which benefited from and participated in this prosperity and which

were the ones left out is a question which needs to be tackled separately because, then as now,

prosperity and stark poverty continued side by side.

Thus, the Sultanat, far from being a 'dark age' as postulated by some, saw the breaking of the rigid,

narrow economic and social mould which had dominated the country between the 8th and 12th

centuries, and created conditions for development, even though in a limited form.