12.(MEDIEVAL INDIA)ESTABLISHMENT OF PORTUGUESE CONTROL IN THE INDIAN SEAS AND ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL IMPACT

References: Satish Chandra(Medieval India) and JL Mehta(Advanced Study In History Of Medieval India).Also minor facts from other books and figure and facts from verified Internet sources.
12.ESTABLISHMENT OF PORTUGUESE CONTROL IN THE INDIAN SEAS AND ITS ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL

IMPACT

The landing of Vasco da Gama at Calicut in 1498 with three ships, guided by a Gujarati pilot, Abdul

Majid, is generally regarded as the beginning of a new era in world history, especially in the relationship

between Asia and Europe. Although Asia and Europe had been in commercial relations with each other

since antiquity, the opening of direct sea-relations between the two was not only the fulfilment of an

old dream—according to the Greek historian, Herodotus, the Phoenicians had rounded Africa in the 6th

century BC, it presaged big increase of trade between the two. This, however, was only one of the

objectives of the Portuguese. For the Portuguese, the opening of a sea-route to India would give a big

blow to the Muslims—the Arabs and Turks, who were the traditional enemies of Christianity, and were

posing a new threat to Europe by virtue of the growing military and naval power of the Turks. A direct

sea-link with India would displace the virtual monopoly of the Arabs and Turks over the trade in eastern

goods, especially spices. They also vaguely hoped that by their exploration of Africa they would be able

to link up with the kingdom of the legendary prior John, and be in a position to attack the Muslims from

two sides. Thus, the commercial and religious objectives supported and justified each other.

A search for a sea route to India had been attempted in post-Roman times by Genoa. In 1291, a

Genoese, Ugolino di Vivaldo, had set out with two galleys to find his way to India by the ocean route,

but was never heard of. Subsequently, the lead in this search was taken by Portugal. From 1418, Dom

Henrique, the ruler of Portugal,

called Henry the Navigator, sent two to three ships every year for the exploration of the West Coast of

Africa. The occupation of Africa upto the mouth of the river Congo between 1443 and 1482 gained

Portugal trade in ivory, slaves, and gold dust, and whetted their appetite. The rounding of the southern

tip of Africa in 1487 by Megallan opened the sea-route to India. But it was another ten years before it

was taken up by Vasco da Gama.

At the outset, it should be made clear that while the Europeans had their own objectives, their seeking a

direct sea-route to India was not because the Arabs and Turks hindered in any way the trade of eastern

good to Europe or were charging excessive taxes. In fact, with the rise of Islam, the Arabs had emerged

as the principal traders of the world, especially in the field of long distance trade. Their merchants,

sailors and geographers linked even more closely than before the sea-trade between the Mediterranean

and Asia, and in Asia between West Asia, India, East Africa, South-East Asia and China.

Nor were the Turks allergic to trade. The trade from the Orient flowed from the Persian Gulf via Hormuz

and Basra to the Levant, and from the Red Sea via Jeddah to Cairo and Alexandria in Egypt. There were

also land-routes leading to Black Sea ports. The custom duties levied on these goods was a rich source of

profit to the Arab and Turkish rulers, and they had every reason to protect and cherish this trade.

Despite the Pope banning trade with the heathens, i.e. Muslims, Genoese and Venetian merchants were

active in the trade in oriental goods. In fact, the Venetian merchants had a virtual monopoly of buying

the oriental goods in Egypt and the Levant, and distributing them all over Europe. Though the Venetians

and the Turks fought long and bitter naval battles, neither side pushed it to a level which might harm

their mutual trade. They were hence considered "complementary enemies". The principal rivals of the

Venetians in Europe were the Genoese. The Genoese were also active in distributing oriental goods in

Europe, but had been side-lined by the Venetians. The capture of Constantinople by the Turks in 1453

was a big blow to the Genoese because the Black Sea ports, their principal mart for oriental goods, were

gradually closed to them. This, and their old rivalry with Venice were the main factors which led Genoa

to help Portugal and Spain with ships, money and nautical skills in searching for a sea -route to India. As

is well known, Christopher Columbus who 'discovered' America (or re -discovered, because the

Norsemen had reached there earlier, as also the Red Indians) in 1492 in his effort to find a sea-route to

India was a Genoese.

Interest in the search for a sea-route to India was spurred also by the Renaissance which challenged

rooted modes of thought, and created a new spirit of daring. At its background was the economic

growth of Europe from the 11th century. Recent research shows that with growing prosperity and

growth, the dietary habits of the Europeans had also changed, with more meat being consumed. Much

of the cattle in Europe had to be killed during winter due to shortage of fodder, and the meat salted

away. Oriental spices were even more in demand in order to make the salted meat more palatable.

Growing interest in oriental trade was shown by the arrival of many Genoese traders in the Indian

Ocean from the thirteenth century onwards. The names of the Venetians, Nicolo Conti and Barbosa, of

the Russian Nikitin are only a few among the many others who travelled on the Indian Ocean, and

reached India during this period. The Pope also showed his growing interest in the search for a sea-route

to India when in 1453, he issued a Bull granting Portugal "in perpetuity" whichever lands it "discovered"

beyond the Cape in Africa upto India, on condition of converting the "heathens" of those lands to

Christianity. It will be seen that this also implied excluding the other Christian powers from participating

in this noble enterprise!

i. The Asian Oceanic Trade Network before the Coming of the Portuguese

In order to understand the impact of the Portuguese on Indian and Asian trade and economy, a brief

review of the nature, structure and working of the Asian oceanic trade net work before the coming of

the Portuguese is necessary. This is specially so because during the hey-day of European colonial

domination, many wrong and unfounded notions about Asian trade and economy, and the role of the

European traders in the region were put forward. Many of these have had to be discarded or modified

as a result of the researches carried out in recent years, both by European and Asian scholars. Their

researches themselves have been shaped by the new outlook which emerged following the end of the

era of colonialism, the economic growth of the countries of the region, and their efforts to re-explore

their roots, and mutual linkages.

First and foremost, the new researches have tended to show that there was no basic difference in the

internal structure of trade and commerce between Asia and Europe before the rise of industrial

capitalism in the west. Thus, both European and Asian merchants

sought exclusive information about the markets they operated in. The bigger traders in Asia were

remarkably flexible in their approach. They were prepared to trade in any commodity which was

anticipated to yield a good profit. There was, thus, much less specialisation than in the modern times.

There was, however, a clear distinction between wholesale traders and retailers. The big merchants who

were the most active in emporia or long distance trade, could be active both in domestic and foreign

trade. They could also be bankers, money-lenders and insurance agents. Some of them had their own

ships, although the carrying of goods, both over-land and over-seas, was also a specialised vocation. A

definite pattern of trade between different regions and ports had developed, as a result of wind

movements, ocean currents, and distances. Thus, journeys originating in the Red Sea, or the Persian Gulf

ports did not generally go beyond Gujarat, or the Malabar ports. Goods for south-east Asian ports were

shipped from Gujarat, Malabar or the Coromondal. Chinese traders, and Chinese junks, or ocean going

ships had earlier come to Malabar. But following a ban on foreign trade by the Ming rulers in the

fifteenth century, Chinese traders did not go beyond the south-east Asian states.

The captaincy of ships over these vast distances needed nautical skills and experience for which the

Asian sailors—Arabs, Indians, Malays and Chinese were not wanting. The captains (nakhudas) of ships

were highly esteemed. They commanded good wages, and also had a part interest in the goods they

were carrying. The ships also contained many small traders, to whom the word peddler can be applied.

The big traders, however, did not fall in this category. Apparently, they stayed at their base of

operations. In their working, Asian merchants, like Europeans, drew upon family connections, as also on

associations based on community of interest, region etc. Thus, we hear of the association of merchants

called Karimi, located at Aden in the Yemen, whose activities extended upto China. Burmese merchants

also had their own trade associations, as also the Indians. Thus, Maniraman was an association of South

Indian merchants which remained active in domestic and foreign trade for a long time.

We do not have much information about the rich trading families of Asia during this period, because

such records never found their way to national archives. However, we do hear of rich merchant, such as

the Iranian, Ramist, who around 1100 AD organised commercial activity extending from Aden to India

and to China; of Gamel-al-Din Ibrahim Tibe who in the thirteenth century organised

a fleet of one hundred ships which travelled to South India and the Far East. The names of Vastupal and

Tejpal in Gujarat are well-known. They were also very rich Chetti merchants in Tamilnadu, in Bengal and

the Maraccars in Malabar. Considering that the Asian trade at the times was much bigger than the

European trade—some modern historians assess it at ten times the volume of European trade, it is not

surprising that some of the richest merchants were to be found in Asia at the time. Yet, for a long time,

the Asian traders were indiscriminately called peddlers by some European scholars, and many of our

own scholars accepted it. However, it is not these merchant-princes who mattered. What mattered or is

significant, in fact, was the size and range of the trading communities in Asia, the multiplicity of their

activities, their undoubted entrepreneurial skills, and the financial and shipping resources which they

disposed of. Also, unlike many of the European traders, the Asian traders did not depend upon their

states for political or military support.

A second misnomer was the concept that the oriental trade consisted only of "the great and the trifling,"

i.e. luxury goods. This may have been largely true for trade with Europe which imported in the main, silk

and jade from China, spices from the Spice Islands and India, and some types of cloth from the Middle

East. But in the Indian Ocean region, the items exchanged included the basic necessities of life, such as

salt, sugar, grains and clothing, in addition to luxury items such as spices, horses, silk, Chinese porcelain,

incense, ivory, glass, jewellery and finely cut precious stones, slaves etc. Trade in the necessities of life

was necessary because in areas such as the south-east Asian Islands, rice production was very limited, as

also clothing. Salt, sugar and food-grains were needed in the Middle East. Also, pre-modern merchant

ships could not have operated without low value bulk cargo which could serve as ballast. Thus, goods

brought to India or China included heavy cargoes, such as dates, sugar, building material, and timber.

Climate and geography also dictated the movement of goods, and the direction of trade. Thus, ships

from the Middle East reached the Indian sea ports before the arrival of the monsoon. The goods were

transhipped there, and carried in different bottoms to the southeast Asian countries or China. Malacca

was also another point of transhipment. While the Chinese did not go beyond Java-Sumatra, the Arabs

and Indians traded right upto China. Thus, both the range of trade, and the bulk of the goods carried

was impressive for the pre-modern world.

A third misnomer is that Asian ships could not carry out long distance voyages across open seas because

their ships were frail, and Asians lacked the necessary nautical techniques. Modern research shows that

these ideas lack a foundation. It were the Indians who had started the open sea voyage from Gujarat to

Aden, and across the Indian Ocean to South-East Asia and to east Africa. Thus, when Vasco da Gama

sailed for Calicut from Malindi in East Africa, he found four Indian ships there. The Portuguese Covilhan,

travelling on Arab ships, had covered the itinerary which was later followed by Vasco da Gama. It has

been shown that even frail boats could sail on the open seas, from the Malay peninsula to the Mauritius

on the basis of ocean currents. But these were not important for trade.

Much has been made of the Indian tradition of sewing ships instead of nailing them. According to the

Arab geographers, the nailing of ships began in the region of the Persian Gulf region in the 10th century.

However, sewn ships continued to be used because these had greater flexibility than nailed ships, and

could be repaired more easily. This was an advantage in the shallow waters and swift currents of the

Persian Gulf region. That both sewn and nailed ships were in operation in the Indian waters was noted

by the Portuguese, Gaspar Correa, writing in the early part of the sixteenth century. He says that the

sewn ships "remain as secure as if they were nailed. There are other ships which have the planks nailed

with thin nails with broad heads." Perhaps, it was the nailed ships which sailed across the open seas.

Nor were these ships small in size. By the time the Portuguese came, the boats plying in the region were

from 350 to 400 tonnes which was heavy tonnage for the time, and had several masts. Although the

Chinese junks which were several storeyes high were the most advanced in ship construction at the

time, the type of ship used in the Indian waters was the Arab boom. Since timber for ships was not

available in Arabia or Persia, most of these ships were generally built in the Gujarat or the Malabar

region. Thus, Indian and Arab ship building traditions had mutually influenced each other, and their

trading ships were not inferior to the European. Regarding nautical techniques, the Chinese had a

mariner's compass since the 10th century, but it was not widely used. Arab and Indian sailors fixed their

position on the open sea with the help of stars, using the azimuthal sidereal-rose (compass card or

kamal). However, the mariners compass was of great use for sailing over unchartered waters.

The traders who actively participated in the sea-borne sea-trade of Asia followed well established

conventions which had developed in course of time. The traders were not only Arabs and Iranians but

Jews, Armenians and even Genoese. Apart from Gujaratis and Tamil Chettis, the Javanese were also

active in the sea trade. The life and property of these traders were protected by the rulers, and certain

well defined commercial laws were observed. Custom duties were generally kept within limits. While

the conventions were violated sometimes, such violation would harm the concerned state since trade

was highly competitive, and in the situation, traders would move away to another port. According to

convention, the rulers, while taxing trade, did not try to dominate the seas, or protect or expand their

trade by armed intervention on land or sea, though while conducting military operations on land, they

were not forgetful of commercial advantages.

In Asia, the only armaments the ships carried were soldiers and rockets as a safeguard against seapirates who were active on the coasts of Oman and Malabar, as also in south-east Asia and China.

Notable exceptions to this had been the Chola naval expeditions against Java-Sumatra in the 14th

century, and Chinese Admiral Cheng Ho's seven voyages between 1417 and 1433, carrying a large flotilla

of ships armed with rockets and thousands of soldiers upto East Africa and Jeddah. While these ships

conducted some trade, their primary purpose was of showing the Chinese flag and making the

governments of the region more receptive to Chinese trade, influence and culture. But due to domestic

reasons, the Chinese discontinued such expeditions and even banned foreign trade. These two examples

suggest that under different circumstances, the tradition of trading under the protection of armed ships

might have risen in Asia also. But this did not happen, and even the Chinese expeditions made so little

impact that they are not even mentioned by any of the native observers in the countries visited by the

Chinese fleet.

Due to all these factors, the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were unusually prosperous in the history

of the Indian Ocean. Although by the second half of the 15th century, Chinese traders had withdrawn

under the orders of the Chinese Court, and the Karimi merchants of Yemen, as well as the Jews had

stopped their operations—perhaps in the face of Arab competition, there was no "commercial vacuum",

as has been argued by some historians. Nor was there any Arab monopoly of trade in the western India

Ocean, though the Arabs were certainly the richest and the most powerful group of long distance

traders in the region.

These factors explain why the Portuguese, who came to Asia for capturing the trade in Asian goods to

Europe, stayed behind to capture the trans-Asian trade through use of force.

ii. The Portuguese Estado da India

When Vasco da Gama landed in Calicut, he was cordially received by the Zamorin, and permitted to

trade in spices, and to set up a factory (ware-house) on the coast. The spices carried back by Vasco da

Gama were computed at sixty times the cost of the entire expedition. But this did not satisfy the

Portuguese ruler. The Portuguese wanted to enforce a monopoly over the spice trade to Europe, and

claimed the right of searching the ships of Arab traders. This led to a fight in which the Portuguese living

in their factory were massacred. In retaliation, the Portuguese ships bombarded Calicut before they

withdrew. In 1502, Vasco da Gama returned with a fleet of twenty-five vessels, and demanded that the

Zamorin should expel all the Muslim merchants settled there, and not to allow any Muslim merchants to

land at any of his ports, or to have any trade relations with them. The Zamorin rejected these demands

on the ground that the port of Calicut was open to all, and that it would be impossible to prohibit

anyone from trade, whether he was a Muslim or not. Gama's answer was a brutal assault on Calicut.

This was followed by establishing a number of forts at Cochin, Quilon etc. to dominate the Malabar

trade.

What was at issue here were two different philosophies of relationship between trade and the state.

The Asian convention was of open trade, with the governments backing and supporting trade but not

using their military or naval strength to promote or protect it. This was so even in China where the Court

had always exercised close control over foreign trade, and treated items of import as "tribute". On the

other hand, the Mediterranean tradition which the Portuguese brought with them was of a combination

of trade with warfare on land and sea. This approach was profoundly upsetting to the Asian traders, as

well as to many of the small states of the region, such as Calicut, Cochin, etc. which, like some of the city

states of Europe, were heavily dependent on trade, but followed the convention of open trade without

the use of military or naval force.

Alarmed at the growing power of the Portuguese, the Sultan of Egypt fitted a fleet and sent it towards

India. The fleet was joined by a contingent of ships from the ruler of Gujarat. The Zamorin of

Calicut also lent his support, as also the rulers of Bijapur and Ahmednagar. After an initial victory in

which the son of the Portuguese governor, Don Almaida, was killed, this combined fleet was routed by

the Portuguese in 1509. This naval victory made the Portuguese navy supreme in the Indian Ocean for

the time being, and enabled the Portuguese to extend their operati ons towards the Persian Gulf and the

Red Sea.

Shortly afterwards, Albuquerque succeeded as the governor of the Portuguese possessions in the east.

He advocated and embarked upon a policy of dominating the entire oriental commerce by setting up

forts at various strategic places in Asia and Africa. This was to be supplemented by a strong navy.

Defending his philosophy, he wrote "A dominion founded on a navy alone cannot last." Lacking forts, he

argued, "neither will they (the rulers) trade or be on friendly terms with you."

Albuquerque initiated this new policy by capturing Goa from Bijapur in 1510. The island of Goa was an

excellent natural harbour and fort. It was strategically located, and from it the Portuguese could

command the Malabar trade and watch the policies of the rulers in the Deccan, It was also near enough

to the Gujarat seaports for the Portuguese to make their presence felt there. Goa was, thus, suited to be

the principal centre of Portuguese commercial and political activity in the east. The Portuguese were

also able to extend their possession on the mainland opposite Goa, and to blockade and sack the

Bijapuri ports of Danda-Rajouri and Dabhol, thus paralysing Bijapur's sea-trade on the mainland. They

sacked and blockaded the Bijapuri ports of Danda-Rajouri and Dabhol till the Adil Shah came to terms by

ceding Goa. From their base at Goa, the Portuguese further strengthened their position by establishing a

fort at Colombo in Sri Lanka, and at Achin in Sumatra, and the Malacca port which controlled the exit

and entry to the narrow gulf between the Malay peninsula and Sumatra. The Portuguese also

established a station at the island of Socotra at the mouth of the Red Sea, and besieged Aden. Vasco da

Gama failed to capture Aden—his only failure in the area. However, he forced the ruler of Ormuz which

controlled entry into the Persian Gulf to permit them to establish a fort there.

During this period, a major concern of the Portuguese was to bring under control the forts of Diu and

Cambay which were the centres of Gujarati trade to the Red Sea. The Portuguese made two attempts in

1520-21 to capture Diu but both were defeated by its governor, Ahmad Ayaz.

The Ottomon Turks, under Sulaiman, were passing through the most magnificent period of their history;

they were poised to attack Europe, and also to complete their conquests in Asia. In 1529, the Turks

besieged Vienna which was saved by the timely intervention of the Poles. Earlier, the Turks had

defeated the ruler of Iran in 1514 and then conquered Syria, Egypt and Arabia. This implied an

increasing role of the Ottoman Turks in the Indian Ocean.

The sultan of Gujarat sent an embassy to the Ottoman ruler congratulating him on his victories, and

seeking his support. In return, the Ottoman ruler expressed a desire to combat the infidels, that is the

Portuguese, who had disturbed the shores of Arabia. From this time onwards, there was a continuous

exchange of embassies and letters between the two countries. After ousting the Portuguese from the

Red Sea in 1529, a strong fleet under Sulaiman Rais was despatched to aid Bahadur Shah, the ruler of

Gujarat. Bahadur Shah received it well, and two of the Turkish officials, who were given Indian names,

were appointed governors of Surat and Diu respectively. Of these two, Rumi Khan was later to earn a

great name for himself as a master-gunner.

In 1531, after intriguing with local officials, the Portuguese attacked Daman and Diu, but the Ottoman

commander, Rumi Khan, repulsed the attack. However, the Portuguese built a fort at Chaul lower down

the coast.

Before the Gujarat-Turkish alliance could be consolidated, a bigger threat to Gujarat appeared from the

side of the Mughals. Humayun attacked Gujarat. In order to meet this threat, Bahadur Shah granted the

island of Bassein to the Portuguese. Following the expulsion of the Mughals from Gujarat, he once again

appealed to the Ottoman sultan for help and tried to limit the Portuguese encroachments at Diu.

However, Bahadur Shah was killed in 1536 in a fracas with the Portuguese. Subsequent efforts to

recapture Diu failed.

The Turks made their biggest naval demonstration against the Portuguese in Indian waters in 1536.

Their fleet consisted of 45 galleons carrying 20,000 men, including 7000 land soldiers or janissaries.

Many of the sailors had been pressed into service from the Venetian galleys at Alexandria. The fleet,

commanded by Sulaiman Pasha, an old man of 82, who was the most trusted man of the Sultan and had

been appointed the governor of Cairo, appeared before Diu in 1538 and besieged it. Unfortunately, the

Turkish admiral behaved in an arrogant manner so that the Sultan of Gujarat withdrew his support. After

a siege of two month, the Turkish fleet

retired, following news of the arrival of a formidable Portuguese armada to relieve Diu.

The Turkish threat to the Portuguese persisted for another two decades. In 1531, Peri Rais, who was

assisted by the Zamorin of Calicut, attacked the Portuguese forts at Muscat and Ormuz. Meanwhile, the

Portuguese strengthened their position by securing Daman from its ruler. A final Ottoman expedition

was sent under Ali Rais in 1554. The failure of these expeditions resulted in a change in the Turkish

attitude. In 1566, the Portuguese and the Ottomans came to an agreement to share the oriental trade,

including spices, and not to clash in the Arab seas. Following this, the Ottomans shifted their interest

once again to Europe. This precluded a future alliance with the rising Mughal power and the Turks

against the Portuguese.

iii. The Portuguese Impact on the Indian Ocean Trade Netivork

The Portuguese ended the era of unarmed open sea- trade in the Indian waters, and gave a big blow to

the virtual Muslim monopoly of the trade in the western part of the Indian Ocean, and their trade of

eastern goods to Europe.

However, the Portuguese effort to push out the Muslims from the trade in oriental goods, and to

establish a Portuguese monopoly over the trade in West Asia had only limited success. Thus, by the

middle of the sixteenth century, inspite of the large volume of spices brought to Lisbon and marketed in

Europe, mainly through Antwerp, the Black Sea ports and the markets of the Levant and Egypt were as

well supplied with eastern goods—spices, dyes, and cotton and silk textiles as before. It may be noted

that right from the beginning, the Portuguese king had declared trade in spices, drugs, dyes including

indigo, copper, silver and gold, and arms and ammunition to be royal monopolies. Traders of no other

country, whether in Asia or Europe, including Portuguese private traders and royal officials, were

permitted to trade in these commodities. Even ships engaged in trade in other commodities had to take

a permit or cartaze from Portuguese officials. The Portuguese attempted to force all ships going to

Malacca or to East Africa to pass through Goa, and to pay tolls there. Any ship which was suspected of

carrying "contraband" or banned goods, or which refused to be searched could be treated as a prize of

war, and sunk or captured, and the men and women aboard treated as slaves.

The Portuguese soon found that they stood to lose more on land than gain on sea by continuing such

practices, because traders who lost on sea put pressure on their governments to retaliate against

Portuguese trade in their areas. Also, it was impossible to police the trade along all the lagoons on the

coasts in Asia. Sea-pirates preying on Portuguese ships were active in areas such as Oman, Malabar, and

South-East Asia, and Portuguese policies brought them greater encouragement and support from

traders and small rulers.

Hence, the rules regarding giving cartazes to local traders had to be liberalised. This included Muslims

traders. Trade in horses which was exclusively in the hands of Muslims, was a highly profitable trade. It

was also of great strategic importance to various rulers. The Muslims were also active in trade in many

other commodities, such as textile products, glass, aromatics and coffee in which the Portuguese had

neither the money nor the ships to engage themselves. Hence, the dictates of trade and profit soon

overcame religious prejudices.

The Portuguese were unable to monopolise even the trade in pepper and spices. This was so because, in

the first place, the Portuguese private traders were unhappy with the royal attempt to monopolise the

trade in these commodities. Royal officials, who received small salaries, were often in league with

private traders, Portuguese as well as Arabs, Gujaratis etc. to line their own pockets. In consequence,

the cartaze system proved to be both corrupt and leaking like a sieve.

The Arab and Gujarati traders in these commodities also found ways and means the get round the

Portuguese trade embargo. The Portuguese control over the Indian Ocean waters remained incomplete

because of their failure to capture Aden and thereby control entry to the Red Sea. The Turkish conquest

of Syria, Egypt and Arabia, and the expansion of their naval power, both in the eastern Mediterranean

and the Red Sea, made it difficult for the Portuguese to effectively carry out their blockade of Bab-elMendel, the entrance to the Persian Gulf. At the other end of the Indian Ocean, the Portuguese control

even on the Spice Islands weakened. The Portuguese had to contend with a naval power there willing to

take on their warships. This was the north Sumatra ruler, Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah. Using the traditional

Javanese naval skills, he was able to defeat the Portuguese in many naval skirmishes, and to capture

large number of guns from the Portuguese to fortify Acheh. He also approached the Ottoman Sultan for

military equipment. The Ottomans had a high reputation in the field of casting guns. They

supplied bronze guns of a calibre to enable Acheh in north Sumatra to withstand a siege. This enabled

Acheh to emerge as a major centre of the export of spices, in competition to Malacca which was under

Portuguese control. Arabs and Gujaratis who were well entrenched at Malacca, used Acheh as a centre

for export of spices to the Red Sea via the Laccadives, thereby by-passing the Portuguese controlled

Malabar waters.

Thus, the structure of the Asian trade net-work; the strength and resourcefulness of the Asian

merchants, Arabs, Gujaratis, Tamils and others, who had long experience of operating the system; the

naval and military strength of Turkey and of the ruler of north Sumatra, and the internal limitations of

the Portuguese and of the working of the cartaz system in the Portuguese Empire of India—or the

Estado da India—were important factors in limiting the success of the Portuguese. It should be kept in

mind that Portugal itself was a small country, and though it had developed rapidly in the field of

commerce, its financial resources were limited. Thus, German and Italian merchants and merchanthouses became the principal agents for distributing all over Europe the eastern goods brought to Lisbon

by the Portuguese. Demand in Asia for European goods which could be exchanged for purchase of

pepper and other eastern goods was limited. Hence, precious metals, especially silver had to be

exported. But unlike Spain, Portugal did not have the silver mines in America to fall back on, and had to

depend heavily on Italian and German financiers. The expectation of the Portuguese king that

Portuguese control of the coastal trade of India would pay for the export of pepper and other eastern

goods to Europe also remained a misnomer. Hence, the Portuguese trade to Europe remained confined

to only twelve to thirteen ships being sent each year from Lisbon to India. However, this picture changed

by the end of the 16th century. The share of the private Portuguese traders— mainly New Christians—in

the Portuguese trade to Europe rose sharply, amounting to over 90 per cent of the total. The additional

cargo consisted mainly of textiles and precious stones. The Portuguese private traders financed this

trade by large scale involvement in Asian trade. However, for the Portuguese government the

Portuguese enterprise in the western part of the Indian Ocean remained, what Steensgaard calls, largely

a "redistributive enterprise", i.e. its main source of income was taxing the trade of others rather than

expanding trade, or opening up new lines of trade. A real expansion of trade between Europe and the

East had to await the coming of the Dutch and the English in the 17th century.

However, it was in the Far East that the Portuguese had some limited success in expanding trade and

opening up new avenues. They took over the export of textiles from the Coromondal Coast to the

Indonesian Archipelago where, in exchange, they could purchase spices. There was never any question

of monopolising the trade in spices there, the Javanese and the Malays being active in the field. The

Portuguese carried spices to China, buying Chinese silk in exchange, and taking it to Japan in exchange

for silver. This exchange was very profitable because the Peking court had banned the Chinese from

foreign trade for fear of piracy. Hence, the Portuguese could step in. But the Portuguese could take only

one great ship every year from Macau to Japan.

Apart from this trade, another avenue of trade which the Portuguese opened up was trade to south

America via the Philippines. There was a consistent demand for Indian cotton goods in the Philippines.

Since the Spanish rulers had banned Muslims and Protestants from trading with the Philippines, it gave a

good opening to the Portuguese. They also accommodated some Armenians and Gujaratis in the trade.

From the Philippines, Spanish galleons took the Indian textiles to South America where they were

exchanged for silver. The profits of the Far Eastern trade was so profitable that Portugal could afford to

take a more relaxed stand on its pepper trade in the Indian Ocean.

Thus, the second half of the sixteenth century emerges as an era of growing partnership between the

Portuguese and Asian merchants. Many Arabs and Gujarati merchants found it more profitable to load

their goods on Portuguese ships, while Portuguese private traders or officials used Asian ships to evade

the royal monopolies.

It has been argued that the Portuguese established transparency in the eastern trade by setting up a

network of factories or warehouses in widely separated areas whereby markets and prices became

more stabilised, hence transparent. Modern research does not support this argument. Wide fluctuation

in prices was a characteristic of pre-modern trade. Also, Indian and Arab merchants knew the distinction

between spot and future markets. For spot markets, they had ware-houses which were necessary in

order to get the best prices, buying when there was a glut, and selling when there was a shortage.

Coffee was an example of such a commodity. But for fine textiles, and goods such as spices, the goods

and prices had to be fixed in advance. The Asians managed this through their own trade associations

and family network. The Portuguese tried to fix the prices of black pepper in advance by pressurising or

giving inducements to local rulers in Malabar to supply pepper to them at fixed prices, leaving it to the

ruler to procure the supplies through

local traders, or to deal directly with the cultivators. The Portuguese policy was unpopular because they

tried to use political pressure to depress the prices paid to the cultivators, and of trying to prevent their

competitors from bidding. Hence, any expansion of the production of spices was of little benefit to the

cultivators.

Despite claiming to be lords of the territories of the East, the Portuguese impact on the political system

in Asia was small. They were too few in numbers to try to capture and keep hold of any large territories

on the mainland in India or elsewhere. Hence, they wisely decided to keep their control confined to

islands, and to forts on the coast which could be defended and supplied by sea. The island of Goa, which

became their seat of government, was a prime example of this. Apart from this, they could, by threats

and persuasions, induce rulers of small states, such as Calicut, Cochin, Craganore etc. to act as their

agents or brokers in the spice trade.

The Portuguese set-up at Goa was controlled by a Governor-General, assisted by a Council which

included the Ecclesiastical Head. On account of their small numbers, the Portuguese encouraged mixed

marriages and, in course of time, a new Indo-Portuguese or Goanese society came into being. But the

society and government itself was organised on rigid racial lines, people of pure Portuguese origin being

at the head of the society, and people of mixed origins at the bottom. Nor were the latter given any

share in political power. The Church exercised on occasions the dreaded "auto da fe" or burning at the

stake to root out heresy among Christians.

Thus, the contribution of the Portuguese in the field of politics or expansion of world trade remained

negligible. However, the significance of the Portuguese opening the direct sea-route to India cannot be

dismissed as inconsequential. It opened the way for India's closer integration with the growing world

economy, and contributed to the further growth of a market economy in India. It was also a blow

(though not a breach) to what a modern historian, Kirti Chaudhuri, calls India's "introspectiveness". As a

result of the Portuguese contact, many products of the Latin American world—potato, corn, pineapple

entered the Indian rural economy, just as new breeds of fruits had come in the wake of the Turks. Thus,

the Indian peasant was not allergic to accepting new products if it meant a profit for him. Under

Portuguese supervision, ship-building, using western techniques, was started at Cochin. However, for

reasons which are not yet fully understood, some other technologies which had made an impact or had

far-reaching effects, such as printing, clocks etc. though introduced in Goa, did not find acceptance on

the mainland.

The crucial question remains: why did Indian powers permit the domination of the Indian Ocean by a

small, and economically backward state such as Portugal for more than a century? As is well known, the

Portuguese domination of the Indian Ocean was endued in the seventeenth century, not by Asian

powers but by the Dutch and the British. We shall take this question up in the context of the rise of the

Dutch and the British.

The basis of Portugal's success in establishing its naval domination of the Asian seas has been much

debated. It is now accepted that technologically, the Indo-Arab boom and the Chinese junk could match

the Portuguese galleons and caravelles in their strength, holding capacity for goods in view of its

tonnage, and capacity to sail even in the face of the wind with their lateen (triangular) sail. They had

sufficient nautical skills to travel on open seas. Where the Portuguese were superior was the

maneuvering capacity of their ships, the Indo-Arab ships being slow and clumsy on account of their

heavy sails. Also, the hulls of the Portuguese ships were stronger to withstand the shock of firing

cannons. But, it has been argued, it was above all the determination of the Portuguese sailors which

decided the issue. The Indians, more used to fighting pirates, had no stomach for fighting on sea,

unbacked by their own rulers.

Thus, it was not military and naval technology alone, but a number of other factors which enabled the

Portuguese to establish a naval domination over the Indian seas for more than a century. The Indian

powers reconciled themselves to this dominations because it did not threaten their own political

positions on the mainland. Nor did it adversely effect their income from overseas trade. Hence, the task

of undertaking a naval conflict with the Portuguese appeared difficult, uncertain of success, and likely to

yield little financial returns.